upou,norindeed be justified in his providence; ye(, as we vindicate to God the glory of all good, so we do not quite banish the notion of Fate neither, nor take away all Necessity ; which is a thing the Clazonieuiau philosopher'[1] of old was taxed for,

affirming *fv$tv* row *ywofiivtav yivtaOtn* K*«0* *sifwpftfvqv, aXXa* «wu MVOV TOVTO rowvo^ta* That nothing at all

was done by Fate, but that it was altogether a vain name. — And the Saddnceans among the Jews have been noted for the saiije:[11] T»jv /utv a/uap/itm/i' *avm-*

cwSfcv *ttvai ravrfjv* a£ioui>T(c> **ovrc** *KCLT* aurijv Ta <*v-

They take away all Fate, and will not allow it to be any thing at all, nor to have any power over human things, but put all things entirely into the hands of men's own free will.— Ami some of our own tsecm to have approached too near to this extreme, attributing perhaps more to the power of free will, than either religion or nature will admit But the hypothesis, that we shall recommend as most agreeable to truth, of a irpoyoca iXacr/ioc, placable providence— of a Deity essentially good, presiding over all, will avoid all extremes, asserting to God the glory of good, and freeing him from the blame of evil ; and leaving a certain proportionate con torn peratiou and eoitt-mixture of contingency and necessity both together in the world ; as nature[1] requires a mixture of motion and rest, without either of which there could be no generation. Which temper was observed by several of the ancients ; as the Phari~

* AutaxagoraH, who wan censured for thin opinion by Alexander Aphrodtsionsis do Fsito, sec. ii. p. II, edit. Loud. 1658, in 12mo.

[11] JoKoplii Anti(|. Judaic. lib. xiiLc. v. sec. ix. p. 640* loin. i. i-dit. HavercampL